As this example shows, being different from the others -- as Muhacir -- does not mean being other than Turkish: it rather means that there are one or more deep societal conflicts about the understanding how to be Turkish, and/or who determines what Turkish and Turkish culture would possibly be. I was told in practically every single interview with Bosniak Muhacirs (and their offspring) in Turkey what they perceive of as the most fundamental difference between themselves and 'the others': they would never -- down "to the seventh or ninth generation" -- ever marry their akraba (= relatives). Cousin marriage -- in the Arabic speaking Middle East described as bint 'amm marriage by anthropologists -- is in Turkey known as akraba evliliği. It is considered to be an eastern practice by Bosniak Muhacir people in Turkey, which corresponds to the fact that in the Balkans, cousin marriage is practically taboo and considered incestuous. Hence, the reactions of many Bosniak Muhacir people to the fact that some of their Anatolian compatriots practice it, often were expressed in extreme disgust. "Bunlar kültürsüz" -- they have no culture -- was often added as an explanatory comment. The importance of this societal conflict, where representatives of both sides can claim their own establishedness and the other side's outsiderness, should not be underestimated in the way how figurative kinship is established through sibling cities (kardeş şehir), either by representatives of the ruling party, or by Muhacir groups: even though representatives of both groups use the same kinship metaphores (like sibling / kardeş) and speak about culture (kültür), they may fundamentally disagree over the meaning and the role of their agnatic or figurative akraba (kinship) -- as the example of akraba evliliği shows. In the same vein, there are fundamental disagreements over the notion of culture, and the way how culture is brokered by official Turkish cultural centers and initiatives on the market of public opinions in the Balkans.
[Public Diplomacy] Turkish-Bosnian sibling cities and a semantic problem with ‚populism'(Part 2/8)
The stress of the Ottoman past in the official Turkish actors' cultural initiatives is the reason why their activities have been classified cultural diplomacy from the very beginning of their visibility in the Balkans. The year 2009, when the first branch of the Yunus-Emre-Cultural Centers opened its doors in the Bosnian capital Sarajevo, can be seen as a first significant benchmark. However, Turkish culture and cultural diplomacy are not only promoted in direct and subtle ways by offical representatives of the Turkish state: from the point of view of soft power – which according to Joseph Nye needs to work subtly in order to be successful – the popularity of Turkish TV-series was (and still is) of enormous relevance. Especially the latter aspect implies that an understanding of the appeal of “Turkish culture” in the Balkans cannot solely be explained by studying the ruling regime's activities: much broader strata of the involved societies (e.g. TV consumers/prosumers in Bosnia and Turkey) and their various discoursive contexts are, as informal actors, involved in the process of cultural diplomacy.