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ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the Yugoslav–Turkish agreement on the resettlement of Muslims from the Serb-dominated lands of southern Yugoslavia to Turkey from 1938. The agreement was part of a broader series of state-directed population resettlement projects in the interwar period that had the demographic homogenization of nation-states in Southeastern Europe and Turkey as their ultimate goal. This study examines the close cooperation of Yugoslav and Turkish state authorities, and depicts commonalities of both states' agents on the way to their bilateral agreement. The two-sidedness of this study will show the complexity of the applied homogenizing programme, consisting in equal measure of policies of exclusion and resettlement, and inclusive and assimilative nationalizing practices. Demographic engineering will be used as a conceptual framework for grasping both sides of the nationalizing projects. Besides resettlement, other methods of demographic engineering will also be taken into consideration by examining two key documents from each country that paved the way to the bilateral convention on the resettlement of Muslims from Southern Serbia to Turkey in 1938. The results of this juxtaposition will show how securitization was intermingled with concepts of national selfhood and otherness by classifying the population into agents and enemies of the state. The inclusion of ethnic criteria in this classification has had important implications down to the present day. Through its overarching regional lens, this study seeks to contribute to a growing number of studies on (forced) migration from Yugoslavia to Turkey by avoiding the shortcomings of a unilateral approach.

Introduction

This article examines bilateral Turkish–Yugoslav attempts to forcibly resettle Muslims from the Serb-dominated areas of Yugoslavia to Turkey in the interwar period. It focuses on the case of Yugoslavia's Muslims from so-called 'Southern Serbia' (Sandžak of Novi Pazar, Kosovo and Macedonia), because, from the perspective of the Serb-dominated first Yugoslav state, the nationalization of those most recently incorporated post-Ottoman territories deserves special attention. The involvement of both states in equal measure has been explored, assuming that only a comprehensive approach from an overarching perspective can adequately decipher the genesis and the character of the bilateral convention on the resettlement of non-Slavic Muslims from Yugoslavia to Turkey of 1938. Demographic

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engineers from both the country of origin and the receiving country had actively participated in negotiating the intended resettlement, and in deciding which Yugoslav Muslims were to be resettled, and which were not. Members of various ministries, administrators, diplomats and politicians were among the men who set the agenda of the homogenizing programme in accordance with the respective 'mental map' of the nation.

Although a growing number of studies on migration from Yugoslavia to Turkey has appeared in recent years, there is still no study that includes and interrelates both countries' nationalizing policies and interests. The main argument for exploring the Turkish and the Yugoslav sides equally is that it is the best way to avoid the pitfalls of methodological nationalism, that is, explaining the bilateral resettlement project from a unilateral perspective and thereby (perhaps inadvertently) adopting one country's viewpoint.[1] Thus, an anticipatory methodological claim of this article is that a one-country- or a one-community-based approach is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it runs the risk of missing the complexity and cross-border interdependencies of the encompassing context. In this sense, the post-Ottoman area on both shores of the Bosphorus, stretching from the Western Balkans to eastern Anatolia, has been the subject of separate area studies over the past decades. This led to the emergence of different traditions of historiography, and resulted in a divergent geographic spread of academic paradigms used for studying forced resettlement and violence against minorities. Secondly, the few existing studies, which have mainly delved into the matter from the perspective of one country or of a single ethnic group, often reflect a one-country-based view of history in accordance with prevailing socio-political parameters. Although these studies deliver valuable archival evidence, they do not necessarily help us understand the broader, transnational context behind the projects of homogenizing demographic engineering in the interwar period in the region and across Europe. This article aims at bringing together and juxtaposing the different perspectives, trying to avoid producing a piece of historiography as the history of one particular nation-state or one group of migrants.[2]

By taking the road less travelled, a major characteristic of the existing scholarship on the subject becomes apparent. Whereas the paradigm of *demographic engineering* is predominant in the non-apologetic historiographical literature on violence against minorities in Turkey, the conceptual pairing of *genocide* and 'ethnic cleansing' has become firmly established in studies on the Balkans.[3] Although either explanatory model seems to be an adequate vehicle for analysing state-forced resettlement policies in the context of violence against minorities, the concept of demographic engineering is given preference in this article. The main reason for this methodological decision is the fact that demographic engineering, as an all-encompassing package of demographic policies, comprises 'ethnic cleansing' as one of its measures. A more detailed discussion on the complementarity and accuracy of both concepts will be discussed in the third part of this article.

The main purpose of this study is threefold. First, it will demonstrate that demographic engineers in ministries, parliaments, embassies and other administrative units in both countries have applied interdependent practices of inclusion and exclusion in a similar way in order to achieve ethno-national homogeneity under the pretext of securitization, informed by the peculiar conditions of the interwar period. Second, it will be shown how demographic engineers have contributed to problematizing ethnic difference and coexistence *per se* by dividing the population along the lines of existing ethnic differences or according to ethno-nationalizing projects in process. Third, the study seeks to

contribute to more general, epistemological conclusions about demographic engineering and the peculiarities of the interwar period as a period of 'half-war', hopefully stimulating inferences for studies on other ethno-securitizing regimes under conditions similar to those of the interwar period. By excluding the perspective of (forced) migrants from Yugoslavia to Turkey and people envisaged for resettlement themselves, this study does not claim to reflect what actually happened; it rather focalizes demographic engineers and their endeavours to achieve ethnic homogeneity.

In the following, a concise literature review on the current developments in the field of forced migration between Turkey and the Balkans will directly tie in with a more elaborate discussion of the concept of demographic engineering as a 'useful analytical tool that is broad but does not lapse into a catch-all category'.[4] In the main part of this article, the premises of the concept will be exemplified by two key documents from interwar Turkey and Yugoslavia. The juxtaposition of both will show that they can unambiguously be classified as proof of the prevailing tendencies of demographic engineering. On the Turkish side, the unit in question is Settlement Law No. 2510 of 1934 (*İskan Kanunu*), which specified the conditions that had to be met by immigrants and refugees in order to be eligible to be part of the Turkish national community, distributed the areas of settlement and decided who had to undergo assimilative practices. In Yugoslavia, the project of the 'Inter-Ministerial Conference on the Resettlement of the Non-Slavic Element from Southern Serbia' (*Interministerijalna konferencija o iseljavanju neslovenskog elementa iz Južne Srbije*) from 1935 clearly identifies which ethnic groups from which areas were to be expelled from Yugoslavia and resettled to Turkey. The efforts of both states finally culminated in the Turkish–Yugoslav convention on the resettlement of non-Slavic Yugoslav Muslims in 1938. Although the Yugoslav–Turkish convention was ultimately not implemented, this study will show how the institutionalized interwar discourse reflects and corresponds with continuing concepts of national selfhood and otherness. In the final part of the article, the advantages of using the concept of demographic engineering as the most useful tool for grasping not only the homogenizing measures themselves, but also the predominant concepts of authoritarian modernization, will be readdressed.

Existing historiographical debates

Although Muslim migrations from the lands that would later become parts of Yugoslavia occurred, for the greater part, before the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Turkey were established, the existing historiography on the topic can be subdivided into two groups alongside the confines of both nation-states. The first group consists of Turkey-based studies, written from the perspective of Turkey as the receiving country and proactive agent, mostly focusing on a particular group of migrants, such as Albanians, Bosniaks or Turks. These studies examine the course of migration with an emphasis on the migrants' violent expulsion from the country of origin. The second group can be classified as Yugoslavia-focused studies that—at least in recent years—seek to understand the political agenda of the sending country, whereas the migrants and their whereabouts in the receiving country remain almost untouched. In the following, an overview of the most seminal post-millennial studies will demonstrate the current interest in migration studies within our geographic sample. This concise review will reveal some of the

methodological and substantial gaps and desiderata for further research that this article addresses.

Examples of the first historiographical current are the most recent studies in Turkish scholarship by Tufan Gündüz and Fahriye Emgili on Bosniak immigration, and by Nurcan Özgür Baklacıoğlu on Yugoslav Albanians in the field of political science.[5] Whereas Gündüz's examination is limited to the period of 1879 to 1912, thus not covering the interbellum, the latter two authors have delivered important contributions to cross-border studies on migration from the Balkans, including sources and secondary literature from Turkish, Ottoman, (ex-)Yugoslav and Western scholarship. Both consider political, economic, violent and other societal factors in the country of origin and, to a lesser extent, in the receiving country. Baklacıoğlu demonstrates the mistrust that Albanian-speaking immigrants were confronted with during the early Republican years, due to the existence of an 'own' Albanian national identity as a possible impediment to Turkish identity, and also because of their alleged role as 'betrayers' in the late Ottoman years[6] and in the Turkish War of Independence (1919–23).[7] Both authors stress the importance and predominant definitions of Turkishness in the interwar period as defined by the Settlement Law No. 2510 from 1934. Emgili emphasizes Turkey's interest in immigrants as a demographic 'wall' against Europe, and shows how these security aspects finally mitigated the Settlement Law's restrictions against non-Turkish-speaking Muslims. She mirrors the controversial discussions on the fuzzy definitions of 'belonging to Turkish culture' (*Türk kültürüne bağlı*) and 'Turkish origin/race' (*Türk ırkından/soyundan*) as the gate of entry into Turkish citizenship, and how Bosniaks were accepted despite their national 'deficiencies' as Slavic speakers.[8] Both authors deliver comprehensive examinations, which are, compared to the small number of apologetic studies on the subject in precedent decades, critical in their evaluation of the receiving country's immigration policies.[9] While they do contextualize the push factors in the country of origin and pull factors in the receiving country, they fall short of being critical assessments of demographic engineering by not including Turkey's contemporaneously occurring violent and assimilative policies of exclusion against others.

As for the second group of Yugoslavia-centred studies, the interest in emigration to Turkey has been less remarkable in recent years than in the preceding decades. Together with Safet Bandžović's less recent works,[10] Vladan Jovanović is a pioneer in studies on the interwar period's project of resettlement of Muslims from so-called Southern Serbia.[11] He has published two of the most important archival sources that reveal the 'plan of resettlement of non-Slavic Muslims from Southern Serbia', as aimed for by the Inter-Ministerial Conference,[12] which he analyses in detail and in the context of the flanking homogenizing and colonizing projects in Yugoslavia's southernmost stretch. Another author, Edvin Pezo, has delivered a meticulous compilation of archival material and minutes, offering us a critical and vast overview of both Yugoslav states' policies and stances vis-à-vis their Muslim populations and state-directed migration to Turkey.[13] However, despite his evaluation of Albanian sources and secondary literature—as contrasted with the substantial exclusion of the Turkish side—his work remains a country study on Yugoslavia, which becomes even more evident in his methodological decision to exclude the war years from his examination. The performance of the Yugoslav state, he argues, was interrupted by the violent interlude of the Second World War, which would deserve its own examination. Instead, he decided to narrow down his selected timespan from 1918 to 1966 to the 'peacetime',

however debatable it may be to classify the interbellum as a period of peace, and however justifiable it may be to venture on understanding the post-Second World War migrations by bracketing out the war years.[14]

Both groups of examined studies allow for the preliminary conclusion that they deliver invaluable material for further study. However, their respective unilateral approach to the genuinely multilateral matter of migration in general, and the bilateral Turkish–Yugoslav convention on the resettlement of non-Slavic Muslims from 'Southern Serbia' to Turkey in particular, cannot bridge the yawning gap between two branches of the same tree. In order to get to the trunk, a recapitulation of the regional context of forced resettlement projects, policies of demographic homogenization and methodological tools for studying them is most helpful.

Demographic engineering and the ethnic homogenization of Southeastern Europe

Demographic engineering as an analytical tool for studying state-directed measures of violence against minorities, including—among others—expulsion, resettlement and assimilative policies, first appeared in the 1990s in the fields of Conflict Resolution Studies and Minority and Genocide Studies in the Anglo-Saxon scholarship. Forerunners of the concept are Milica Bookman Zarkovic,[15] John McGarry,[16] Myron Weiner and Michael S. Teitelbaum.[17] All authors share a transnational or global approach, comprising such different examples of demographic measures as the forced relocation of Native Americans, the Greek–Turkish population exchange in 1923, postcolonial evictions in newly independent states of Africa, and 'ethnic cleansing' on the territory of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, to name but a few.

In their lucid, introductory essay to a three-volume dossier on demographic engineering in the context of the post-Ottoman Balkans and Anatolia, Nikos Sigalas and Alexandre Toumarkine assess a major difference in the regional spread of applied explanatory models between studies on former Yugoslavia and those on Turkey.[18] Regarding recent liberal and Kemalism-critical studies on the Young Turk and early Republican period, as conducted by Nesim Şeker,[19] Fuat Dündar,[20] Uğur Ümit Üngör[21] and many others, demographic engineering has become a widespread concept. In this respect, one of the most prominent topics is the Armenian genocide of 1915, and the Greek–Turkish population exchange, as *ex post facto* legitimized by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

But, contrary to historiography on the Balkans, 'genocide' and 'ethnic cleansing' are often not used as primary explanatory tools; they figure rather embedded within the concept of demographic engineering as its most bloody apogee. The reason for this might also be due to the weight of the unitary state and its legal arms, which have prevented many—notably Turkish—scholars from terming the deportations and killings of Armenians in 1915 'genocide'.[22] The implications are perceived as a threat to the Turkish state by its representatives, who fear legal consequences and restitution claims by Armenian survivors and their heirs if they legally classify the deportations and killings in 1915 as genocide. However, the academic discourse in Turkey has dramatically changed since 2005, when the first conference on 'Ottoman Armenians during the decline of the Ottoman Empire' was held in Istanbul,[23] seconded by the 2013 conference on Islamized Armenians.[24]

In contrast, the conceptual pair of genocide and 'ethnic cleansing' has been firmly established in studies on the Balkans. The prominence of 'ethnic cleansing' and genocide in (post-)Yugoslav scholarship is deduced from, among other things, the juridical internationalization of the 1990s wars in the context of the breakup of Yugoslavia, when the use of both terms became ubiquitous to the public in and beyond the region. Moreover, the regular use of 'genocide' and 'ethnic cleansing' can be retraced to a particular tradition of Yugoslav historiography, where 'state historians' like Vladimir Dedijer contributed to the dissemination of the concept of genocide. Dedijer was a Yugoslav delegation member during the negotiations on the UN Convention on Genocide in 1948, and secretary of the Russell Tribunal on the American military intervention in Vietnam in 1966. In 1972, he introduced the term 'genocide' to Yugoslav historiography, where the use of the internationally sanctioned term increased in the 1980s, notably in the context of the extradition of former Interior Minister of the fascist Independent State of Croatia (NDH, 1941–45), Andrija Artuković, and the affair surrounding Austrian president Kurt Waldheim's involvement in Nazi war crimes. Simultaneously, the discourse on 'genocide against the Serbian people in Kosovo' received its academic consecration through the famous memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, accusing Albanians of committing genocide against Serbs in Kosovo.[25] In Dražen Petrović's assessment, the term 'ethnic cleansing', a loan translation from Serbocroatian 'etničko čišćenje', 'derived its current meaning during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was also used to describe certain events in Croatia'.[26]

Unsurprisingly, we can assess differences in how violence in the name of homogenization is addressed, not only depending on the degree of violence, but also depending on the respective geographic-discursive field. As the concise outline showed, the historiographical discourse in both fields was and still is heavily influenced by legal and political concerns, with important repercussions for how history is written. With this in mind, *demographic engineering* is given preference over the concepts of genocide and 'ethnic cleansing' in this study, mainly because the latter two are encompassed by demographic engineering as its dissimilative side. Moreover, the concept of demographic engineering also accommodates less violent assimilative strategies, such as language nationalism, proactive policies of migration and settlement, and cultural policies as the other side of the same coin. In other words, the interdependent relationship between expulsion, deportation, ethnic cleansing and genocide on the one hand, and settlement policy, colonization and assimilation policies on the other, is—in the given case—reflected most adequately by demographic engineering.[27] A similar approach has been pursued by Harris Mylonas's conceptual decision to study nation-building from a perspective on assimilation, accommodation and exclusion.[28]

Characteristic of ethno-nationalist movements in Europe in the interwar period is the distinction between reliable and loyal *agents of the state*, who either belong to the dominant ethno-national group or are considered to be particularly close to it, and *enemies of the state*, who are distrusted by the state's agents, for they belong to a different ethno-national group.[29] Thus, they are suspected of disloyalty and perceived as a permanent threat to the state. The goal of ethno-nationalist migration policies in interwar Turkey and Yugoslavia basically consisted of consolidating the nation-state based on the nationality principle, that is, a preferably homogeneous population settling on a contiguous territory. In order to achieve the status quo of the respective dominant state population, both

states applied push-pull strategies, where push factors were of a repressive nature, forcing unwanted minorities to leave the state, in order to 'unmix' different peoples. Pull factors, on the contrary, offered desired ethnic groups incentives to settle. According to the literature on demographic engineering and its main assumptions, typical conditions under which states resort to direct or indirect forms of violent demographic engineering are real or imagined situations of threat such as war, rebellion, external irredentist claims of other nation-states, or a constitutional crisis.[30] Such conditions prevailed in both Turkey and the Serb-dominated areas of Yugoslavia in the interwar period. Moreover, the inclusive and the exclusive side of demographic engineering in both countries shaped the bilateral convention of 1938, as will be shown in the next sections.

The Settlement Law of 1934 in Turkey

Demographic engineering in the early years of the Turkish Republic must be seen in the broader context of the long history of Muslim migration from the Balkans and the Caucasus to the shrinking heartland of the late Ottoman Empire, which was engaged in the homogenizing process of post-imperial nationalization. Even more so than preceding Ottoman laws, which regulated the accommodation and settlement of refugees (*muhacir*) from the Balkans, the 1934 Settlement Law No. 2510 was particularly geared to the question of linguistic assimilation of present and anticipated immigrants.[31] Minutes of parliamentary debates on the importance of the Turkish language as the only acceptable language express the dominant conception of Turkishness in the 1930s as a general pattern behind the law. Then Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya defined the government's position accordingly: 'This law will create a country speaking with one language, thinking in the same way and sharing the same sentiment'.[32] After the basic factor of religious affiliation,[33] the predominant reading of Turkishness in the 1930s was cultural and revolved around linguistic unity. A law supplement defined who could be included in the national community: 'Individuals of Turkish race or individuals connected to Turkish culture who speak Turkish and who do not know any other language'.[34]

By narrowing down the group of eligible people who were able to identify themselves as being 'connected to Turkish culture', this definition—at least in theory—had significant consequences for the immigrants from the Balkans: 'Foreign Kurds, Arabs, Albanians; other Muslims who speak languages other than Turkish and all foreign Christians and Jews cannot be given nationality declaration documents. And they cannot be given immigrant papers. They will all be treated as foreigners'.[35] According to Article 3 of the law, two ministries were assigned to decide who exactly was to be treated as 'connected to Turkish culture', and which individuals or population groups were to be considered as being 'of Turkish culture' or 'Turkish origin':

> Accepted are individual settlers of Turkish origin (*Türk soyundan*) or nomadic individuals who want to enter the country from abroad with the aim of settling in Turkey, together with settlers or nomadic individuals and tribes which are of Turkish origin, as well as those settlers who are connected to Turkish culture (*Türk kültürüne bağlı*), and wish to enter on condition of obtaining the opinion of the Ministry of Interior (and on its command), on condition of obtaining the opinion of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, by virtue of this Act and by order of the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance. These [individuals] are called refugees (*Muhacir*).[36]

In practice, certain non-Turkish-speaking Muslim groups of immigrants were given privileged treatment, including Pomaks, Bosnians, Tatars and Karapapaks. Nevertheless, these groups were not immediately considered to be *connected to Turkish culture*, and were supposed to become 'real cultural Turks' as soon as possible. The law classified the population according to three identity markers: (1) Turkish speakers and of ethnic Turkish identity; (2) Non-Turkish speakers, but of Turkish culture; and (3) Non-Turkish speakers and not of Turkish culture. Immigrants or refugees who were considered not to be connected to Turkish culture (*Türk kültürüne bağlı olmıyanlar*), anarchists, spies, nomadic 'Gypsies' (*Göçebe çingeneler*) and persons who had previously been expelled from the country were explicitly not allowed to enter the country.[37] But the Settlement Law did not only envisage newcomers to the national community. The assimilative measures provided by the law were equally aimed at other non-Turkish-speaking Muslims who were already living in the country, as well as at the nomadic population, which was considered to be hardly controllable. The government paid special attention to the Kurdish population and the considerable number of Albanians whose number had, due to migration, risen from 21,774 to 40,647 between 1927 and 1935.[38] Fahriye Emgili concludes that the law was designed both as a tool against the Kurdish revolts and as a social programme for modelling the one-nation-of-Turks project.[39] The Ministry of the Interior was given the right to resettle the population accordingly, solely relying on the criterion of whether the respective population group was considered to be *of Turkish culture* or not. Start-up resettlements were, in any case, subject to the stipulation that no entire villages or settlements emerge with a non-Turkish-speaking majority of inhabitants. Already existing settlements in which a language other than Turkish was predominant could be dissolved at any time, and their residents had to fear forced resettlement. They could even be deprived of their citizenship.[40]

Demographic engineering in the eastern provinces and Thrace

The regions scheduled for resettlement were defined according to the ethnic composition of a particular region's population, but also its strategic military importance. As such, the whole country was divided into three different settlement zones. The first zone was destined for the resettlement of persons *connected to Turkish culture*, since from the official point of view, those regions required demographic nationalization due to their predominantly non-Turkish-speaking inhabitants, or because of their particular location close to major supply lines (such as railways) or in border regions. The second zone consisted of regions with a stable Turkish-speaking majority, and was therefore destined for resettlement with population groups from other zones that were still to be nationalized, including nomads and newcomers to non-Turkish culture. By settling them within Turkish-speaking communities, it was hoped that linguistic assimilation would soon be achieved. The last zone of type three was the forbidden zone, which was taboo for colonization due to strategic, military, political, cultural and 'hygienic' reasons.[41]

Evidence that the eastern areas of Turkey attracted the special attention of the state follows from an additional protocol to the Settlement Law and is not expressed in the law itself. The Kurdish-populated areas of eastern and southeastern Anatolia had challenged the state in 1925 with the Sheikh Said rebellion and, again, from 1927 to 1930 with uprisings in the area around Ağrı (Ararat). Only two years after the adoption of the

1934 Settlement Law, violent unrest would spread to Dersim [Tunceli] and provoke the state's military intervention.[42]

From the areas listed in the additional protocol, a large-scale resettlement of Kurds to western provinces was provided, and, where this was not possible, residents of inaccessible and uncontrollable areas were to be resettled to regions within the same settlement zone that were easier to control. Thrace (on Turkey's northwestern edge, located at the borders with Bulgaria, Greece, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles) drew the state's attention because of its situation in the country's most vulnerable spot. Turkey, like Yugoslavia a member of the Balkan Entente, eyed every step of Bulgarian–Italian rapprochement with extreme caution, because Italian hegemonic claims to the Mediterranean Sea (*mare nostrum*) would—in case of a strong Bulgarian–Italian alliance—have seriously endangered Turkey's sovereignty over Thrace. But it was not only foreign enemies that were feared: Turkey's demographic engineers also distrusted the Ladino-speaking Jewish minority, which lived in Thrace until 1934. Two weeks after the adoption of the new Settlement Law, anti-Jewish pogroms broke out in different locations of Thrace simultaneously, and suggest, as backed up by British and American diplomats, a planned action, even though the Turkish government under İsmet İnönü condemned the pogroms and announced that the perpetrators would be severely punished. As a result of the pogroms, almost the entire Jewish population of Thrace was forcibly relocated to Istanbul. The anti-Jewish pogroms of the 'Thrace affair' were only one aspect of the larger 'ethnic cleansing' of Thrace: in the same year, the resettlement of the numerically smaller Bulgarian population was decided, too. As decisive factors for the events in Thrace, Erol Ülker identifies military-strategic considerations rather than latent antisemitism in Thrace.[43] Prior to the 'Thrace events' in 1934, Rıfat Bali stresses that the Turkish authorities were less concerned with the sheer number of Jewish inhabitants, who were a rather small minority (like the deported Bulgarians). As a result of various studies on the history of Jews in modern Turkey, he concludes that the Turkish state had perceived any non-Turkish minority as a potential fifth column of an enemy— especially in Thrace, which had previously been conquered by Greeks and Bulgarians.[44]

Regions for settlement

Similar to the Kurdish-populated areas of eastern Turkey, the operations in Thrace were embedded in a broader, complementary process of expulsion and resettlement. The Istanbul daily *Cumhuriyet* from 5 January 1933 strongly suggested populating Thrace with expected immigrants from the Balkans for security reasons:

> On arrival the refugees will initially be resettled to Thrace; a big wall must be erected in Europe. They will cultivate the soil, benefit the country, and they will be men, compatriots, who shed their blood for the fatherland at the right time. Empty lands are good for absolutely nothing, because one day they will fall into foreign hands. The Bulgarians have set their eyes on Edirne, Kırklareli, and the whole of Thrace …[45]

Compared with other areas of the country, eastern Anatolia and Thrace registered the highest numbers of immigrants for the period between 1934 and 1937. On 11 August 1934, *Cumhuriyet* reported the resettlement of 20,000 immigrants from Romania to Diyarbakır (in southeastern Turkey), and repeatedly suggested Thrace as a settlement zone for a

new wave of immigrants from Bulgaria, whose arrival was expected soon. A letter from the Thracian General Inspectorate to the Office of the Prime Minister from 1935 tells of the settlement of 100,000 immigrants, of which 10,000 were, reportedly, settled in the east of the country, and the remaining 90,000 in Thrace. Prospectively, he holds that Thrace could accommodate another 350,000 immigrants. According to Ülker, evidence shows that new dwellings for immigrants were constructed during this period of time in Thrace, and that abandoned Greek and Armenian properties were renovated. For the year 1937, Thrace had the highest number of settlements, followed by the eastern part of the country. Other typical destinations for immigrants, like İzmir, Aydın, Bursa and Bilecik (in the Marmara and Aegean region), only had a very low number of immigrants. During the settlement process, state authorities carefully monitored the non-Turkish-speaking inhabitants, who were urged to assimilate to the Turkish nation. Immigrants were allowed to settle, in limited numbers, only in areas with a predominantly Turkish-speaking population, and their dwellings were not to be too far away from the houses of their Turkish-speaking neighbours.[46]

Yugoslavia's unwanted Muslims and the colonization of 'Southern Serbia'

With regard to its unwanted non-Slavic Muslim inhabitants, the Yugoslav authorities monitored the course of the population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923 cautiously. Turkey's increasing reluctance towards non-Turkish-speaking immigrants became evident by the introduction of compulsory language tests at the Turkish Consulate in Skopje, as well as by the concerned communication among Yugoslav diplomats. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia adhered to a policy of colonizing and demographically nationalizing so-called Southern Serbia with Orthodox Slavs,[47] the other side of which was forced emigration of Albanian Muslims. According to Yugoslav press reports in 1925, Turkey was ready to accept 30,000 Muslims from Serbia, and another 50,000 in 1926. Although these reports were neither confirmed nor denied by the Turkish side, they led Yugoslavians to believe that Turkey would welcome all Muslim refugees willingly as soon as they had sold their possessions.[48] In 1928, the expatriation and relocation of unwanted non-Slavic citizens was regulated by paragraph 55 of the Yugoslav Citizenship Act. The persons in question were to be deprived of their citizenship within five years upon application, and in return their names would be removed from all military and local registers. The most important shortcoming of paragraph 55 was that it did not reckon with the lack of cooperation by the host country, and consequently many emigrants were sent back from the Turkish border. The destitute returnees were now completely dependent on the Yugoslav state. It is therefore hardly surprising that the issue of Muslim emigration from Yugoslavia and its financing became a burning issue among Yugoslav and Turkish diplomats.

The Yugoslav authorities were particularly impressed by the Turkish–Romanian agreement on the resettlement of tens of thousands of Romanian Muslims in 1935.[49] From the perspective of the Yugoslav demographic engineers, the agreement on resettlement of Tatars and Turks from the Dobruja region within a time span of five years must have appeared easily transferable to the Yugoslav situation, since (unlike in the case of Greece and Turkey) there were no exchangeable compatriots in Turkey. Yet Yugoslavia was concerned about Turkey's sceptical attitude towards Albanian refugees. The governor

of Istanbul reiterated this stance on the grounds that Turkey was overloaded with settlement challenges arising from the population exchange with Greece. The unwillingness of Turkey to accept Albanians, however, defeated Yugoslavia's own aim of ridding itself of its Albanian population, which was believed to be declarable as being *connected to Turkish culture*.[50] The 1934 Settlement Law and Turkey's attempts to populate and nationalize the contested western borderland with immigrants from the Balkans were well known by the demographic engineers in Belgrade. In his role as an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, former member of the revolutionary organization Young Bosnia (*Mlada Bosna*) and future Yugoslav Nobel laureate in literature Ivo Andrić (author of *The Bridge on the Drina*) stated on 26 September 1935 that the Turkish Foreign Minister Rüştü Aras was finally willing to welcome non-Turkish-speaking emigrants from Yugoslavia, thereby contradicting the preceding refusal:

> The emigrants can take along their movable personal property (personal items, agricultural equipment, etc.). With regard to their immovable property, its value would have to be estimated in a specific way on a case-by-case basis, whereby our state would not place the respective sum at the disposal of the emigrants, but rather grant Turkey a credit for purchasing goods in Yugoslavia. Upon arrival in Turkey, an equivalent amount of land would be placed at the immigrants' disposal, and the Turkish state would use its credit in Yugoslavia in order to meet its needs related to agriculture, the market and public issues (for example, to purchase horses). Most recently, Mr. Rüştü Aras has expressed that Turkey still needs settlers, and that it is prepared to accept from us not only Turks, but also such settlers who aren't Turkish in terms of their mentality.[51]

In Yugoslavia, the formalities for emigrants were further simplified in order to facilitate their accelerated resettlement to Turkey. According to the figures of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, a total of 600,000 Muslims migrated to Turkey in the years leading up to 1935 (of which 400,000 were from Greece). Turkish newspapers of the 1920s and 1930s reported on chauvinist persecutions of Muslims in Yugoslavia, but these were officially denied by Yugoslavia, which stressed that only four passports had been issued for emigrants to Turkey in the early 1920s. In Turkey, many emigrants were in a miserable situation because they were often not permitted to work, which made many of them aspire to migrate back to Yugoslavia. However, the Yugoslav consulates in Turkey had strict orders not to issue visas to returnees under any circumstances. [52]

In search of a bilateral agreement

Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Yugoslavia were re-established in 1925, when the Turkish–Yugoslav Friendship Agreement was signed and deepened with the bilateral agreement on opium cultivation in 1931. In 1933, King Aleksandar I Karađorđević embarked on an official state visit to Turkey, and subsequently the bilateral treaty of friendship, non-aggression, legal agreement, arbitration and reconciliation was signed.[53] Only one year later, the Balkan Entente (which included Greece and Romania) was established; its purpose was to protect against the increasing influence of the Axis powers, Bulgaria and Albania.[54] The extent to which Yugoslav authorities were eager to urge unwanted inhabitants to leave the country is demonstrated by the administrative practice in 1933, when exit visa regulations were simplified to the point where not even a signature of the concerned person was required; a signature of a Yugoslav official was sufficient to

issue exit papers. From the mid-1930s, the issue of Muslim emigration and the expulsion of the 'Albanian masses' increasingly attracted public attention in Yugoslavia. Vasa Šaletić, director of the Agricultural Cooperative Society for Southern Serbia, suggested avoiding the resettlement of Albanians to Albania, and insisting on their resettlement to Turkey, allegedly because of their 'religious fanaticism'. He also proposed an accompanying package of discriminatory measures to accelerate this emigration: Albanians' real estate entries at the land registry office were to be revised and reallocated into the highest possible tax categories. Albanian farmers would be forbidden from cultivating tobacco as a primary source of revenue, and Albanians convicted of slash-and-burn for the sake of new arable land would face draconian punishments. Veterinary regulations were to be checked painstakingly and the reintroduction of serfdom (*kuluk*) was even suggested.[55]

The 1935 Inter-Ministerial Conference on the Resettlement of the Non-Slavic Element from Southern Serbia

On 9 September 1935, the 'Inter-Ministerial Conference on the Resettlement of the Non-Slavic Element from Southern Serbia' (*Interministerijalna konferencija o iseljavanju neslovenskog elementa iz Južne Srbije*) met at Belgrade's Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the aim of developing a concrete plan for the resettlement of the Muslims of Southern Serbia to Turkey. Representatives of five different ministries and the General Staff were involved in the conference. The discussion topics primarily pivoted around the question of the Albanian population along the Yugoslav state borders, whose presence, in the demographic engineers' view, represented a national and military-strategic problem. Concluding that the numerically clearly inferior 'Orthodox element' in the area had failed to nationalize the majority of the 'non-Slavic element', the only remaining solution would be their deportation to Turkey. In light of the unsatisfactory course of past emigration, their resettlement was to be enforced by the state, whereby the preceding year's Turkish Settlement Law was clearly taken into consideration. The conference members explicitly envisaged resettling the unwanted population to Turkey, and not to Albania, ostensibly for financial reasons and a lack of cooperation on the Albanian side, as they refused to accept immigrants from Yugoslavia. But what really lurked behind the Yugoslav position that Turkey would be the only desirable and safe destination for its mostly Albanian-speaking Muslim population was the conviction that Albania would make use of the Albanian population of 'Southern Serbia' as 'agents of the state' in order to realize its own irredentist claims over the contested post-Ottoman territories of Kosovo.[56] Ilija Milikić, chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Conference, made this point explicitly when he said:

> We are convinced, however, that [Albania] acts in this way for national reasons. They [Albania] don't wish a decline in numbers of Albanians (*Arbanasi*) in our country due to future territorial ambitions.[57]

Previous regulations as regards Muslim emigration, as defined in paragraph 55 of the Yugoslav Citizenship Act, were rejected as incomplete and eventually counterproductive, since they had also been used by many Slavic Muslims of the Sandžak of Novi Pazar in a way that did not align with Yugoslav national interests. Slavic-speaking Muslims were, at that time, mostly perceived as actually belonging to 'our people'; thus, emigration of 'Slavic life' (*slovenskog življa*) was undesirable and to be prohibited. It was generally

understood that the emigration of Muslims who were either non-Turkish speakers or classified as not belonging to Turkish culture contradicted the Turkish policies. Yet, from Belgrade's point of view, the resettlement of the Turkish-speaking Muslims of Yugoslavia was a far less urgent matter. They were considered to be a 'peaceful element' (*miran elemenat*), which did not pose a threat to the Yugoslav state; those 'real' Turks lived cut off from Turkey and would, in any case, willingly be absorbed by Turkey at any time later on.

Much more worrying was the question of whether Albanian speakers could be exiled and conveyed to Turkey as 'members of Turkish culture'.[58] The Ministry of Agriculture, which evaluated the past fifteen years of colonizing 'Southern Serbia' as unsatisfactory, considered the area's demographic homogenization through a large-scale resettlement of the 'non-Slavic element' as a particularly urgent issue. Immigrants from other 'passive' areas of Yugoslavia, such as Lika (the former Habsburg military frontier to the Ottoman Empire), Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, were already allocated with all disposable land, with the result that only the emigration of the 'Turkish and Albanian element' (*Turski i arbanaski elemenat*) and the consequent surplus in redistributable real estate seemed to be a sure road to success for the colonization project. Given the previous experiences with Albanian resistance movements (such as the *Kaçak*), warnings of Albanian agitation and acts of sabotage, especially along the Yugoslav–Albanian border, were voiced by the Yugoslav demographic engineers. These questions and concerns were finally addressed by the project of the Inter-Ministerial Conference on the Resettlement of the Non-Slavic Element from Southern Serbia.[59]

The project of the Inter-Ministerial Conference is not the only document from the period that discloses Serbian plans for the state-forced expulsion of the Albanian population. Much better known is the 1937 pamphlet 'The expulsion of the Albanians', whose author, Vasa Čubrilović, would later become a member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) with considerable political influence in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The pamphlet came up again in the 1980s, when the predominantly Albanian demographic structure of Kosovo was at the centre of Serbian nationalist attention.[60]

The 1938 Turkish–Yugoslav convention regulating the emigration of the Turkish population from the region of Southern Serbia in Yugoslavia

In the following years, the implementation of assimilative and exclusionary measures adopted by the Inter-Ministerial Conference, flanked by propaganda and extraordinary measures such as the drainage of swamps by forced labour, punishment of parents for preventing their children from attending Serb schools, and the prohibition of tobacco cultivation, commenced in Macedonia. Albanian schoolbooks were confiscated and the use of Serbian as the only official language was enforced. Delays in court proceedings against Albanians became punishable, outbreaks of cattle plagues in Albanian villages were announced as often as possible, and the Serbification of names and toponyms was pushed on.[61] In 1938, Yugoslav efforts to pass a binding bilateral Turkish–Yugoslav convention for the resettlement of its unwanted inhabitants ultimately met with success. Turkish chief diplomat and Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras agreed to adopt a convention and to form a joint commission that would decide on the selection of migrants and the absorption of the proposed families.[62] On the occasion of follow-up

meetings of the commission in the same year, the issue of transfer and transportation costs—which were to be borne in large part by the Yugoslav state—dominated the bilateral discussions. According to the definition used in the convention and in accordance with the Turkish Resettlement Law No. 2510, the Yugoslav Muslim population 'of Turkish language and connected to Turkish culture', excluding Roma and Nomads, was to be affected by the regulation.[63] In geographical terms, this concerned predominantly Albanian and Turkish-populated areas of the Vardar, Zeta and Morava banovinas; in accordance with the Yugoslav preferences, the Sandžak of Novi Pazar and Bosnia-Herzegovina remained unaffected by the scheme. Slavic-speaking Muslims from these areas who were willing to resettle (such as Bosnian Muhacirs) had no other option but to migrate to the approved regions and then to apply for emigration permits from there.[64]

Turkey agreed to accept 40,000 families (or 200,000 persons) over a six-year period, all of whom were to arrive in the summer months from May to October. Only the rural population was to be settled according to the plan, whereas city dwellers were to be granted the possibility of 'free immigration' (*serbest iskan*), which entailed the possibility of freely choosing one's new place of residence. Upon arrival at the port of Thessaloniki, where the emigrants were to embark, all of their abandoned property and real estate was to finally pass into the ownership of the Yugoslav state, which covered the travel expenses. A lump sum of 500 lira per family or, in total, 20 million lira for all 40,000 families was agreed upon as an expense allowance for the Turkish side. Payments for a fixed number of migrants according to annual lists were to be transferred annually into the account of the Republic of Turkey at the People's Bank of Yugoslavia—thirty per cent in foreign currency and seventy per cent in Yugoslav dinars. Even the intended purpose of the transactions was predetermined by the financially battered Yugoslav state: preference was to be given to tax-exempt purchases of Yugoslav goods on the spot (in Yugoslavia). A tax was only to be levied on particular goods (copper, wool, leather, walnut wood, oil fruits, olives and cereals) that were paid for in foreign currency. Upon the signing of the agreed annual list by the Turkish delegation of the joint commission for emigration, the emigrants would become Turkish citizens. Yugoslavia bound itself to refrain from the conscription of Muslim recruits from resettlement districts.[65]

Turkey soon decided to change the conditions for ratification, and demanded the transfer of a one-time payment of 20 million lira from the Yugoslav side, as well as the resettlement of at least half of the envisaged population within the first three years. Despite the financial challenges, Yugoslavia agreed with the acceleration of the resettlement process. Tirana was informed about the Yugoslav targets and, at different levels, strove for a campaign against the expulsion of Albanians from Yugoslavia. Starting from the early 1930s, the government of Albania was trying to mobilize Albanians in Yugoslavia against their forced emigration, and even sent diplomats to Ankara in order to prevent the Turkish state from accepting Albanians. But even the personal intervention of the Albanian King Ahmed Zogu could not dissuade the Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras from his further promotion of the Turkish–Yugoslav convention.

According to Vladan Jovanović, the fact that the Yugoslav press remained silent about the convention was by no means a sign that the agreement was insignificant; rather, it indicates that the Yugoslav government intended secrecy in its actions, in order not to endanger the implementation of the project by foreign intervention. Ultimately, however, the convention was never implemented. The death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

on 10 November 1938, financial disagreements and the outbreak of the Second World War finally defeated its ratification.[66]

Conclusion

As shown by the juxtaposition and contextualization of the Turkish and Yugoslav efforts of national homogenization, the concept of demographic engineering is a particularly suitable tool for this study. First of all, its typology of practices, assumptions and premises offers a methodological framework that helps compare such different national regimes as Yugoslavia and Turkey in the interwar period. Secondly, and unlike studies focusing on the more specific phenomenon of 'ethnic cleansing', the comprehensive view of the whole scope of coercive demographic and nationalizing measures of demographic engineers accurately grasps the peculiarities of the interwar period. Since the most vicious aspects of demographic engineering, like mass killings, ethnic cleansing and genocide, are concomitant phenomena of wartime violence, it would be misleading to grasp the phenomenon of forced resettlement projects of the interwar period as a manifestation of ethnic cleansing. Through its narrow focus on the very act of violent exclusion, the latter would run the risk of falling short of apprehending the mindset behind demographic engineers' intentions. This is the case because less violent ingredients of their homogenizing projects, such as colonization, settlement policies and agrarian reforms, all of which are untypical for wartime, would be excluded.

The peculiarities of the interwar period allow for three main concluding remarks. Firstly, the exclusive policies of forced resettlement in both countries were intertwined with the inclusive policies of colonization and assimilation. Secondly, the dynamic behind the 1938 convention, as well as its failure, was primarily determined by the (regional) security concerns of both countries. According to the security concerns, the population in both countries (including potential immigrants), was divided into reliable, loyal agents of the state on the one hand, and distrusted, problematized state enemies on the other. Finally, the most problematic remnant of interwar demographic engineering was the amalgamation of securitization and ethnic identity in a twofold act of othering: the other, or state enemy, was defined along ethnic criteria and according to security concerns, whereas the transmission of the homogenizing project from the level of political administration to a broader layer of society was realized through the ethnicized and unequal distribution of privileges and pressure.

In 'Southern Serbia' the plan to get rid of the unwanted Albanian population was compassed by privileging Serbian and Montenegrin Orthodox inhabitants, who were expected to act as trustable administrators of the last contested Ottoman acquisitions. The desired increase in numbers of Orthodox inhabitants was supposed to decrease the influence of autochthonous Albanians, who were accused of foreign loyalty to neighbouring Albania. In Turkey, the aftermath of the Turkish–Greek population exchange and the concomitant loss of the majority of the remaining Christian population after 1915 was still not completely digested. As shown by the anti-Jewish pogroms of the Thrace affair, Sunni Turkish Muslims and Muslim immigrants 'connected to Turkish culture' were trusted by the demographic engineers and given privileged treatment. As long as they were presumed to be assimilable to the Turkish nation, even non-Turkish-speaking Muslims could be granted an immigration permit to Turkey; the same was true for Yugoslavia's Albanians. The methods

of consolidating and strengthening the respective dominant population in their designated positions as owners of the land were similar in both states. Besides settlement and resettlement policies, a complex set of additive push and pull measures were applied, such as the enforcement of the Serbian language in Kosovo and Turkish in Kurdish-speaking communities of Anatolia, massive economic discriminations against Albanian farmers, and the exclusion of certain groups of people from the right to immigrate to Turkey. Whether the result of all these practices was assimilation, emigration, or immigration and settlement, their putative objective was the securitization of the state territory to the benefit of the titular nation.

Despite the absence of permanent war, one of the core assumptions about demographic engineering remains untouched. In theory, forced resettlement mostly occurs in wartime, when no vindication must be conveyed to the public with regard to its violent aspects. However, the interbellum period in Yugoslavia and in Turkey can hardly be classified as a period of peace, much less a period of political stability. The perpetually emerging turmoil in eastern Anatolia, including the Sheikh Said rebellion (1925) and the bombing raids on Dersim (1938), as well as the Albanian Kaçak rebel activities against the Serbian authorities in Kosovo until 1924, fostered a general atmosphere of insecurity in both countries that was amplified by the aspirations of foreign powers across Europe. Similarly to wartime in the strict sense of the term, real or imagined internal and foreign threats provided typical conditions that justified the coercive measures of demographic engineering. Using warrior parlance, which discriminates between allies and enemies, people were reduced to 'elements' on one or the other side of the front line. In the discussions and leading discourses about national identity in both countries, it becomes clear that it was not solely pressing security reasons that motivated the administrative elites in either country. Another important factor was the goal of demographic homogeneity along ethnic lines in and of itself. In accordance with the nationality principle and the prevailing concepts of what a nation should look like in the interwar period, it was believed that only a nation-state that is based on an ethnically homogeneous populace settled in a contiguous territory was a solution worth aspiring to. The titles of the Inter-Ministerial Conference of 1935 and the bilateral convention on resettlement both hint at and obscure who was targeted as an enemy by the Yugoslav demographic engineers: the non-Slavic, Albanian Muslims of the southern stretch of Yugoslavia. Although all other inhabitants of 'Southern Serbia' were confronted with assimilative measures, including Slavic Muslims of the Sandžak and non-Muslim Slavic Macedonians, only the 'Albanian masses' were labelled as state enemies, allegedly due to their potential foreign loyalty to neighbouring Albania. In Turkey the situation was even more complex, as a considerable population stratum, consisting of various population groups, was mistrusted. This applied primarily to insurgent Kurds, but also to the small number of remaining non-Muslim minorities. All minorities—most of which (like the Kurds) were not actually recognized as minorities—were perceived as a potential threat to the state. To distil all the examined discussions down to the core, one could sum up by saying that everybody who was not considered to be (or to be able to become) a Turk in Turkey or a Serb in 'Southern Serbia' was declared a problem.

Finally, there is one problematic aspect of the prevailing ethno-nationalist concept in each country that might be overlooked by the constant use of the term 'demographic engineering'. The term gives the impression that demographic engineers were a limited

group of individuals, belonging to the administrative state elite, whose profession it was to make and adjust the nation as if it was some sort of formable modelling clay that simply needed to be brought into shape according to the envisaged nationalist mindset. This makes the term problematic despite the fact that it reflects the modernist *Zeitgeist* remarkably well, especially given the use of the word 'element' instead of 'people' by the demographic engineers in the ministries and other state authorities. Undeniably, demographic engineers were individuals, and as such mainly responsible for classifying and institutionalizing ethno-national concepts of selfhood and otherness. Nevertheless, agency was also transferred to a much broader layer of society—as agents of the state or state enemies—with important consequences for the *longue durée*. As the course of history shows, the institutionalization of the concepts of the national self and others in the interwar period has proven to be extremely resilient, and they were mobilized again in later inter-ethnic conflicts.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

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Notes

1. Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller created a prolific discussion on the correlation between migration and the way in which it is made a subject in social science, by taking nationally bounded societies to be the naturally given entities to study. See Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, 'Methodological nationalism, the social sciences, and the state of migration: an essay in historical epistemeology', *International Migration Review*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2003, pp. 576–610.
2. Thomas Schad, 'Demographisches Unternehmertum in der Türkei und Jugoslawien. Das Beispiel staatlich forcierter Migration jugoslawischer Muslime zwischen den Weltkriege' (MA thesis, Freie Universität Berlin, 2011).
3. See Nikos Sigalas and Alexandre Toumarkine, 'Ingénierie démographique, génocide, nettoyage ethnique. Les paradigmes dominants pour l'étude de la violence sur les populations minoritaires en Turquie et dans les Balkans', *European Journal of Turkish Studies* [online], Vol. 7 (Demographic Engineering—part I), 2008, available at: http://ejts.revues.org/index2933.html. Retrieved 10 January 2011.
4. Uğur Ümit Üngör, 'Seeing like a nation-state: Young Turk social engineering in eastern Turkey, 1913–50', *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008, p. 16.
5. The most recent studies were completed by Tufan Gündüz, *Alahimanet Bosna. Boşnakların Osmanlı Topraklarına Göçü 1879–1912* (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2012); Fahriye Emgili, *Boşnakların Türkiye'ye göçleri (1878–1934)* (Istanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2012); and Nurcan Özgür

Baklacıoğlu, *Yugoslavya'dan Türkiye'ye Göçlerde Arnavutlar (1920–1990)* (Istanbul: Derin Yayınları, 2010).

6. See Mehmet Hacisalihoğlu, *Die Jungtürken und die Mazedonische Frage (1890–1918)* (Munich: Wissenschaftsverlag, 2003), pp. 298–300.
7. Baklacıoğlu, *Yugoslavya'dan Türkiye'ye Göçlerde Arnavutlar*, pp. 429–438.
8. Emgili, *Boşnakların Türkiye'ye Göçleri*, pp. 374–382.
9. See H. Yıldırım Ağanoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Balkanlar'ın Makûs Talihi Göç* (Istanbul: Kum Saati Yayınları, 2001) or Halim Çavuşoğlu, '"Yugoslavya-Makedonya" Topraklarından Türkiye'ye Göçler ve Nedenleri', *Bilig*, Vol. 41, Spring 2007, pp. 123–154, available at: www.acarindex.com/dosyalar/makale/acarindex-1423873288.pdf. Retrieved 11 September 2016. Ülkü Köksal and Hikmet Öksüz, 'Emigration from Yugoslavia to Turkey (1923–1960)', *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, Vol. 9, 2004, pp. 145–177.
10. Safet Bandžović, 'Ratovi i demografska deosmanizacija Balkana (1912–1941)', *Prilozi*, Vol. 32, 2003, available at: http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=747e3521-8533-4a4f-b9cc-9989bd1e6580&articleId=d242327a-3938-4dca-a5d5-09c7f6c81720. Retrieved 10 January 2011.
11. Although 'Southern Serbia' was not an official administrative unit throughout the 1930s, Serbian demographic engineers did call the area of present-day Kosovo, Sandžak (in Montenegro and Serbia) and Macedonia Southern Serbia.
12. Vladan Jovanović, 'Priprema plana za iseljavanje Jugoslovenskih muslimana u Tursku 1935. Godine', *Novopazarski Zbornik*, No. 34, 2011, pp. 213–26.
13. A broad bibliographic overview on migration from Yugoslavia to Turkey—excluding Turkish sources and secondary literature—is offered by the same author. See Edvin Pezo, *Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten? Jugoslawische Migrationspolitik und die Auswanderung von Muslimen in die Türkei (1918 bis 1966)* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013), pp. 33–48.
14. Pezo, *Zwangsmigration*, pp. 31–34.
15. Milica Zarkovic Bookman, *The demographic struggle for power: the political economy of demographic engineering in the modern world* (London: Frank Cass, 1997).
16. John McGarry, '"Demographic engineering": the state-directed movement of ethnic groups as a technique of conflict regulation', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1998, pp. 613–618.
17. Myron Weiner and Michael S. Teitelbaum, *Political demography, demographic engineering* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2001).
18. Sigalas and Toumarkine, 'Ingénierie démographique'.
19. Nesim Şeker, 'Demographic engineering in the late Ottoman Empire and the Armenians', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2007, pp. 461–474, available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/17444904/Seker-2007-Demographic-Engineering-Ottoman-Empire. Retrieved 10 January 2011.
20. See Fuat Dündar, 'The settlement policy of the Committee of Union and Progress 1913–1918', in Hans-Lukas Kieser (ed.), *Turkey beyond nationalism. Towards post-nationalist identities* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), pp. 37–42; and Fuat Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin Sifresi: Ittihat ve Terakki'nin Etnisite Mühendisligi 1913–1918* (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2008).
21. Uğur Ümit Üngör, 'Geographies of nationalism and violence: rethinking Young Turk "social engineering"', *European Journal of Turkish Studies* [online], Vol. 7 (Demographic Engineering—part I), 2008, available at: http://ejts.revues.org/index2583.html. Retrieved 10 January 2011; and Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The making of modern Turkey. Nation and state in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–1950* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
22. For instance, the historian Taner Akçam was accused of 'insulting Turkishness' on the grounds of a column in the Istanbul-based Armenian newspaper *Agos*, supporting its managing director Hrant Dink, who was being prosecuted for using the term genocide, and who would be killed by a Turkish nationalist three months later. Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code was often used for similar reasons. For the article, see Hrant Dink, '301 ve Bir Suç Duyurusu', Agos, 6 October 2006.
23. In 2011, an edited volume containing the documentation of the 2005 conference appeared under the aegis of Istanbul Bilgi University: Fahri Aral (ed.), *İmparatorluğun Çöküş Döneminde Osmanlı Ermenileri: Bilimsel Sorumluluk ve Demokrasi Sorunları (23–25 Eylül 2005)* (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2011).

24. All contributions and screenings from this conference are available at the homepage of the Hrant Dink Foundation: http://www.hrantdink.org/?Detail=753&Lang=en.
25. Sigalas and Toumarkine, 'Ingénierie démographique', pp. 14–18; and Olivera Milosavljević, 'Zloupotreba autoriteta nauke', in Nebojša Popov (ed.), *Srpska strana rata. Trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju*, 2 vols. (Belgrade: BIGZ, 2002), I: pp. 340–374.
26. Dražen Petrović, 'Ethnic cleansing: an attempt at methodology', *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1994, p. 343.
27. I should add that not *every* massacre nor every genocide must be part of a project of demographic engineering, whereas genocides of the 'first European modernity' (Ulrich Beck), like the Armenian genocide, *were* part of such a project. A discussion on the differences between genocides seems to be an urgent desideratum, especially in the light of the ongoing and doubtlessly forthcoming *climate wars*. As Harald Welzer suggests in *Klimakriege* [Climate wars], current conflicts and recent genocides, like Darfur—which he classifies as the first climate war—*are* genocides, without being the consequence of an ethnically defined mental map of ethnic or demographic engineers. A truly comparative study should be carried out, backed up by empirical research and including different cases of genocide and massacres from various periods and socio-geographic contexts. See Harald Welzer, *Klimakriege. Wofür im 21. Jahrhundert getötet wird* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2014).
28. See Harris Mylonas, *The politics of nation-building: making co-nationals, refugees, and minorities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
29. McGarry, '"Demographic engineering"'.
30. McGarry, '"Demographic engineering"', p. 613.
31. *İskân Kanunu* No. 2510 (14 June 1934/7 Teşrinievvel 1336), *Resmî Gazete*, No. 2733, available at: http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/2733.pdf. Retrieved 11 September 2016.
32. Erol Ülker, 'Assimilation, security and geographical nationalization in interwar Turkey: the Settlement Law of 1934', *European Journal of Turkish Studies* [online], No. 7 (Demographic Engineering—part I), 2008, p. 8, available at: http://www.ejts.revues.org/document2123.html. Retrieved 10 January 2011.
33. According to Kemal Kirişçi, Atatürk himself was against the immigration of Orthodox-Christian, Turkish-speaking Gagauz people from Bessarabia. See Kemal Kirişçi, 'Disaggregating Turkish citizenship and immigration practices', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2000, p. 15.
34. Naci Kökdemir (ed.), *Eski ve Yeni Toprak, İskan Hükümleri ve Uygulama Klavuzu* (Ankara: n.p., 1952), p. 235, in Ülker, 'Assimilation', p. 11.
35. Ülker, 'Assimilation', p. 13.
36. Translated by the author from the original text: 'Türkiye'de yerleşmek maksadile dışarıdan münferiden gelmek istiyen Türk soyundan meskün veya göçebe ferdler Sıhhat ve İçtimai Muavenet Vekilliğinin mütalaası alınmak şartile Dahiliye Vekilliğinin emrile ve müçtemian gelmek istiyen Türk soyundan meskün veya göçebe ferdler ve aşiretler ve Türk kültürüne bağlı meskün kimseler işbu kanunun hükümlerine göre Dahiliye Vekilliğinin mütaleası alınmak şartile Sıhhat ve İçtimai Muavenet Vekilliğinin emirlerile kabul olunurlar. Bunlara muhacir denir.' *İskân Kanunu* No. 2510 (14 June 1934/7 Teşrinievvel 1336), *Resmî Gazete*, No. 2733, Yayımlandığı Düstur: Tertip 3, Cilt 15, Article 3, available at: http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/2733.pdf. Retrieved 11 September 2016.
37. *İskân Kanunu*, Fasıl 1, Madde 4.
38. Ülker, 'Assimilation', pp. 14–23.
39. Emgili, *Boşnakların Türkiye'ye göçleri*, p. 374.
40. Ülker, 'Assimilation', pp. 14–23.
41. 'Yer, sıhhat, iktisat, kültür, siyaset, askerlik ve inzibat sebeplerile Hükümetçe iskân ve ikamet yasak edilip boşaltılması istenilen üç numaralı mıntakalar halkı, iklime, yaşayış şartlarına ve bu kanunda yazılı kayitlere göre 1 veya 2 numaralı mıntakalara nakil ve iskân edilirler.' *İskân Kanunu*, Fasıl III, Madde 14.
42. Ülker, 'Assimilation', pp. 24–31.
43. Ülker, 'Assimilation', pp. 26–33.

44. Rıfat N. Bali, 'The 1934 Thrace events. Continuity and change within Turkish state policies regarding non-Muslim minorities' (Interview with Rıfat Bali), *European Journal of Turkish Studies* [online], Vol. 7 (Demographic Engineering—part I), 2008, available at: http://www.ejts.revues.org/document2903.html. Retrieved 10 January 2011; and Rıfat N. Bali, *1934 Trakya Olayları* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012).
45. Emgili, *Boşnakların Türkiye'ye göçleri*, p. 376.
46. Ülker, 'Assimilation', pp. 34–38.
47. Vladan Jovanović, 'Tokovi i ishod međuratne kolonizacije Makedonije, Kosova i Metohije', *Tokovi Istorije*, No. 3, 2006, pp. 39–40, available at: https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=62107. Retrieved 11 September 2016.
48. Vladan Jovanović, 'Interministerijalna konferencija Kraljevine Jugoslavije o iseljenju neslovenskog elementa u Tursku 1935', *Prilozi*, Vol. 35, 2006, pp. 105–124, available at: http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=71b90221-f052-4186-b9e9-0389316b7066&articleId=790b50aa-8cbc-48f2-b987-1805efca0047. Retrieved 10 January 2011.
49. According to Baklacıoğlu, the Yugoslav representatives had the chance for a direct knowledge transmission from their Romanian colleagues, who were invited to the preparatory commission for the 1938 agreement. See Baklacıoğlu, *Yugoslavya'dan Türkiye'ye Göçlerde Arnavutlar*, pp. 157–159.
50. Jovanović, 'Interministerijalna konferencija', pp. 109–110.
51. Translated from the original, quoted from Safet Bandžović: 'Iseljenici bi sobom mogli poneti svoju pokretnu imovinu (lične stvari, poljovrivredni inventar, itd.). Što se tiče nepokretnosti, one bi se imale proceniti na izvestan način za svaki konkretni slučaj i te sume ne bi naša država ustupila iseljenicima, nego bi otvorila Turskoj jedan kredit za kupovinu robe u Jugoslaviji. Iseljenici kad dođu u Tursku dobili bi za odgovarajuće sume zemljišta u Turskoj, a turska država bi se služila kreditom u Jugoslaviji za podmirenje svojih privrednih, trgovačkih i državnih potreba (na pr. za kupovinu konja). Najzad g. Ruždi Aras je izjavio, da Turska treba stanovništvo i da je voljna da primi od nas ne samo Turke nego i stanovništvo koje je po mentalitetu turskom.' In Ivo Andrić, *Diplomatski Spisi* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1992), pp. 134–135, quoted in Bandžović, 'Ratovi i demografska deosmanizacija', p. 216.
52. Jovanović, 'Interministerijalna konferencija', pp. 110–111.
53. On 27 November 1933, the friendship agreement (*Dostluk ve Saldırmazlık Antlaşması*) was signed in Belgrade, and on 28 November 1933 another agreement on mutual interests in Ankara. Cf. and Der Türkisch-jugoslawische Friedens- und Freundschaftsvertrag vom 20. Oktober 1925, *Europäische Gespräche [Hamburger Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik]*, Vol. 4, 1926, pp. 206–207.
54. Jovanović, 'Interministerijalna konferencija', pp. 111–112.
55. Arhiv Jugoslavije, 37-22-175, pp. 362–365, in Jovanović, 'Interministerijalna konferencija', p. 113.
56. Jovanović, 'Interministerijalna konferencija', p. 113.
57. Translated from: 'Međutim, naše je uverenje da ona to čini iz nacionalnih razloga: ona ne želi smanjenja broja Arbanasa kod nas zbog budućih teritorijalnih pretenzija', in Jovanović, 'Interministerijalna konferencija', p. 114.
58. Jovanović, 'Interministerijalna konferencija', p. 115.
59. The complete project can be found in Jovanović, 'Interministerijalna konferencija', pp. 117–118.
60. Vasa Čubrilović, 'Iseljavanje Arnauta', in Bože Čović (ed.), *Izvori velikosrpske agresije* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1991), pp. 106–124.
61. Jovanović, 'Interministerijalna konferencija', p. 119.
62. The English translation of the convention's text, with the original French title *Convention réglementant l'émigration de la population turque de la région de la Serbie du Sud en Yougoslavie,* is available at Robert Elsie's homepage: http://www.albanianhistory.net/1938_Convention/index.html. Retrieved 11 September 2016.
63. Jovanović, 'Interministerijalna konferencija', p. 119.
64. Jovanović, 'Interministerijalna konferencija', pp. 118–119.
65. Jovanović, 'Interministerijalna konferencija', p. 120.
66. Jovanović, 'Interministerijalna konferencija', pp. 121–122.